The subject of this paper is objectivity from Kant's point of view: or better, my own perspective on Kant's perspective on objectivity. More precisely, I want to draw attention to some aspects of the latter, which I believe are too narrow and must be widened before we can benefit from a Kantian approach today.

Mr. M is an eighty-five-year-old who presented to the hospital with congestive heart failure exacerbation, pneumonia, altered mental status, and sepsis. A physician determines that he lacks capacity, and the team in the intensive care unit looks to the patient's daughter, Celia, as his surrogate decision-maker because she is named as an agent in his medical power of attorney form. While in the ICU, Mr. M suffers acute respiratory distress secondary to pneumonia and thus requires intubation. Celia accepts several life-sustaining (...) interventions, but she sporadically refuses other medically indicated therapies. Although providers explain the importance of the ICU insulin regimen for glucose control, she either refuses the insulin or requests a lower dose. The health care team believes that it is providing substandard care and that Celia's medical decisions are not in the patient's best interests, so they request an ethics consultation. When the clinical ethicist attempts to talk with Celia, she refuses to speak with him, saying flatly, “I am not interested in talking with you.” The clinical ethicist meets with Celia on a couple of occasions, but she consistently refuses to have a conversation with him. He wonders if the patient's surrogate decision-maker can refuse a clinical ethics consultation and is unsure what his next steps should be. (shrink)

As the worlds of economics, politics, culture, and communications face a growing wave of globalization that will likely continue, ethical challenges for journalists have also gone global. I propose a clear division between ethics codes for media owners, the public, and professional journalists and present a set of considerations and specific rules applicable only to the last group. In this article I advocate a universal code of journalistic ethics but point out problems and warn against dangers that have made the (...) application of such codes difficult in the past. A universal code should consider the voluntary nature of such an endeavor, the cultural and economic differences in various journalistic traditions, and the problem of producing solutions acceptable to all involved. (shrink)

The theme of Aesthetics in Present Future concerns the new chances the arts have and the deep changes they are undergoing, due to the new media, and the digital world in which we are growingly immersed. That this world is to be understood from an aesthetic point of view, become clear if we think of how much of what we produce, and observe and study is offered through images in particular and perceptual means in general.

El objetivo del presente estudio es describir dos experiencias de implementaci ó n de un programa de intervenci ó n dirigido a j ó venes y adolescentes españoles y dominicanos. El programa se desarrolla mediante la estrategia de gamificaci ó n a travé s del videojuego "Aislados" que contribuye al desarrollo del aprendizaje social y emocional. Se comparan las experiencias, incluyendo los resultados de autopercepci ó n en ambos contextos.

Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness is a restatement of a naturalistic theory of ethics. It is an interesting book for many reasons, since the author changes her position from a broadly Humean position to a more thoroughly Aristotelian one. Foot criticizes the non-cognitivist stance and various forms of expressivism and utilitarianism. She now declares that there are categorical imperatives, a thesis she used to deny. These imperatives are based on the idea of «patterns of natural normativity» which depend on the forms (...) of life we are talking about. Human life needs practical rationality in order to flourish, and this means to have a rational will, without «volitional defect». Yet, this strategy confines practical rationality to an instrumental value and, more importantly, it can’t stand the objection that, after all, being human or flourishing as human may not be a normative ideal, e.g. from a Nietzschean point of view. Only if the will has an intrinsic side constraint as pure will, the Nietzschean objection can be faced: even a Will of Power cannot will against itself. But it can still will against nature. Naturalism, at least in this version, cannot face such a challenge. (shrink)

_In this symposium, Roberto A. Carleo III, Gregory Doukas and Imogen M. Sullivan think alongside Carlos Alberto Sánchez about the contingency of human existence as it is understood in Mexican existentialism. They ask: Should the notion of a metaphysical substance be discarded altogether due to its misuse in the history of European philosophy? Or are there philosophical reasons to avoid ontological uncertainty by, for example, postulating the notion of a non-discrete substance? And if attempts to define human substantiality merely (...) seek to defy this accidentality, should scholars with deviant identities deliberately engage in a wandering beyond dominant frameworks to evade the material and hermeneutical hostility of these frameworks? How should they work alongside others to best take up their responsibility? In his reply, Sánchez considers what the project of accidentalization would imply for each of these carefully-crafted interventions._. (shrink)

At De Principiis II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink, Damascius states that ‘Being will be that which provides being itself to each thing, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι’. The modern reference translation of the De Principiis, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders the phrase left here in Greek as ‘et selon ce qu’elle est comme être’. Combès interprets it by stating that being is here conceived of as the constitutive unity of each form, at once (...) responsible for both its essence and existence. I argue that both a translation and an interpretation of καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and I defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s Sophist – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of De Principiis II, pp. 56-99 Westerink. (shrink)

Damiano Costa has recently offered a novel mereological definition of endurantism based on the idea that for an object to be wholly present at a time is for it to be a whole at that time. In this paper, I argue that Costa’s is not a definition of endurantism, since the idea that every object is a whole at every time it exists can be accepted by endurantists and perdurantists alike.

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 122-164, May 2022. I argue that the consensus view that one must never level down to equality gives rise to a dilemma. This dilemma is best understood by examining two parallel cases of leveling down: one drawn from the economic domain, the other from the political. In the economic case, both egalitarians and non-egalitarians have resisted the idea of leveling down wages to equality. With no incentives for some people to work (...) hard social productivity will likely decline, further lowering people's wages and thus leaving everybody all-things-considered worse off as a result—hence “never level down.” On the other hand, however, the argument against leveling down does not appear to pass muster in the political sphere: denying political equality in the form of “one person, one vote”, for example, by giving a higher share of voting power to people with, say, more education seems straightforwardly objectionable, even if such a voting scheme would improve the outcomes of all people, including those who are ultimately left with fewer votes. Thus, a fundamental tension arises: we can either endorse the widely-affirmed “never-level-down” thesis, which says that sacrificing people's well-being exclusively for the sake of promoting equality can never be the right thing to do, or we can endorse the principle of “one person, one vote.” But we cannot do both. I defend this dilemma against a view I call the compatibility view: roughly, that because OPOV is strictly necessary to advance some weighty, non-egalitarian interest people have, accepting OPOV as a principle of justice is compatible with one's rejection of leveling down. (shrink)

This article contains a case study of some innovative early fourteenth-century conceptions of the temporal structure of substantial change. An important tenet of thirteenth-century scholastic hylomorphism is that substantial change is an instantaneous process. In contrast, three early fourteenth-century Aristotelian commentators, first Walter Burley and then John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, progressively develop a view on which substantial change is linked to temporal duration. This process culminated, in Buridan and Albert of Saxony, with the explicit recognition of the temporally (...) extended nature of some (if not most) instances of substantial change. This article sheds light on this neglected episode in the history of late medieval hylomorphism taking as its point of departure these commentators’ discussions of the issue of minima naturalia, i.e., the issue of the lowest possible limit of any division of substantial forms coming about through the potentially infinite division of the matter they inform. In short: is there a piece of matter so small that no substantial form can possibly inhere in it? (shrink)

El escrito rastrea cómo en la estética del Romanticismo alemán se da el viraje del genio como mediador absoluto, hacia un yo absolutizado que se comprende a sí mismo como superior a lo real. En primer lugar, se reconstruyen algunos principios clave acerca de la noción de genio y su importancia para el proyecto de reunificación entre hombre y mundo en el Romanticismo. Y, en segundo lugar, se muestra cómo, a partir de la imposibilidad de la obra de arte y (...) del artista por asir lo absoluto, estos principios son vertidos hacia la existencia tomándose como ideal ya no lo absoluto sino un vivir estético. Esto último desde la elaboración que hace Søren Kierkegaard de la estética romántica en O lo uno O lo otro I. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on some of (...) Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v57-walton.

De acuerdo con la ontología monadológica de Leibniz, decir que todo ser vivo es imperecedero implica que no existe en sentido estricto la muerte, o, mejor dicho, que ésta es sólo aparente. Leibniz no sólo va a sostener que las mónadas no pueden perecer por medios naturales, sino también que aquello que llamamos muerte no implica la separación del cuerpo y el alma. En el presente trabajo de investigación pretendo realizar un comentario crítico al §89, I de sus Essais de (...) Théodicée, uno de los pasajes emblemáticos en los que el hannoveriano desarrolla la distinción entre dos formas de subsistencia. (shrink)

I re-examine the starting point of the Philebus’ description of the ‘divine method’ and argue that the vexed phrase τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι at 16c9 refers to sensibles only. In doing so, I especially stress the significance of the phrase τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων at 16d1. The proposed interpretation fits the rest of the description of the ‘divine method’, preserves the Forms’ unmixed nature and the consistency of the Philebus.

Roberto Gronda & Tullio Viola – Your work is frequently referred to as “pragmatic history.” This notion, however, is by no means a new one: Polybius spoke of pragmatikê historia, Germany had pragmatische Geschichte in the tradition of Kantian anthropology. Can you tell us something about how you understand this label, and about your own encounter with “pragmatic history”? Simona Cerutti – Personally, I had quite an idiosyncratic introduction to pragmatic history, although this encounter was n...

In the literature on mereology it is often accepted that mereological universalism entails extensionalism. More precisely, many accept that, if parthood is assumed to be a partial order, the thesis that every plurality of entities has a mereological fusion entails the thesis that different composite entities have different proper parts. Central to this idea is the principle known as ‘Weak Supplementation’ which many take to impose an important constraint on the relation of proper parthood. In this paper I argue that (...) this claim is false as the principle that I will call ‘Minimal Supplementation’ appears to be capable of doing all the work done by Weak Supplementation but without entailing extensionalism if conjoined with universalism and core mereology. (shrink)

Management of different types of partnerships plays a decisive role in company performance. Complex business ventures, such as those created to serve low-income populations, usually include both cross- and same-sector partnerships. However, the initial diversity featured in these alliance portfolios diminishes as companies take their ventures up to scale. This article develops theoretical propositions about the evolution and configuration patterns of portfolios that include both cross- and same-sector partnerships. Two longitudinal case studies serve to illustrate the theoretical framework developed for (...) alliance portfolios that include both types of partnerships. Companies that create such portfolios adopt partnership strategies that follow paths also identified in the evolution of portfolios only made up of partnerships with other private firms: i.e., an evolution from adapting to shaping and exploiting strategies. (shrink)

This paper compares the conception of substantial change put forth by Peter of Mantua (d. 1399) in his De primo et ultimo instanti with the one developed by Albert of Saxony (ca. 1320–1390). According to Albert, (i) each substantial form, save for the intellective soul, is a spatially-extended entity with actual quantitative parts that are co-located with the parts of matter they inform, and (ii) these quantitative parts are generated and corrupted one after another over an extended interval of time. (...) From (i) and (ii), Albert deduces that (iii) the substantial change of material substances as individuals (save for human beings) is a temporally extended process. This is what I call the ‘piecemeal’ conception of substantial change. I show that Peter of Mantua is significantly indebted to this conception. Indeed, he endorses both (i) and (ii). Moreover, he even extends this approach to the process by which the intellective soul informs matter and is separated from it. Nevertheless, I argue that, thanks to his peculiar doctrine of numerical sameness over time, Peter rejects (iii) and maintains, instead, that the substantial change of any material substance as an individual is an instantaneous event. (shrink)